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Fishers and Territorial Anxieties in China and Vietnam: Narratives of the South China Sea 
Beyond the Frame of the Nation 
 




In the geopolitical conflict over the South China Sea (SCS), fishers are at the center of Chinese 
and Vietnamese cartographic imaginations that define the sea as either “Chinese” or 
“Vietnamese” and hence tied to the disputed territories of the Paracel and Spratly Islands. While 
their historical presence and customary fishing rights in the SCS have been much publicized in 
the context of this territorial dispute, the long-standing Cham seafaring trade networks and 
legacy are ignored by both countries. The ethnic and national categories of Cham, Việt, and Han 
intersect with occupational categories such as those of fisher, trader, shipbuilder, sailor, and 
pirate, which in the past represented shifting, relational, and situational activities by the same 
people. The contemporary use of such professional and national labels produces particular 
political effects by projecting recent closures and enclosures onto the past, in spite of the 
common historical, cultural, and ethnic flows that always existed in the SCS. Rather than aiming 
to legitimize or delegitimize Vietnam’s or China’s territorial claims to the SCS, this article 
argues that seafaring narratives should be liberated from abstract, anachronistic discourses of 
sovereignty, territoriality, and territorial anxieties that separate the interconnected histories of the 
Cham, Vietnamese, and Chinese. 
 




By taking its jurisdictional claims to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal in 2013, the Philippines challenged China’s demand that it not 
internationalize the issue of the South China Sea (SCS). On June 12, 2016, the definitive ruling 
issued by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague made global headlines. The 
court not only refuted China’s “nine-dash” claim1 on the basis of historic rights, but it also stated 
that “although Chinese navigators and fishermen, as well as those of other states, had historically 
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made use of the islands in the South China Sea, there was no evidence that China had historically 
exercised exclusive control over the waters or their resources.”2 Opening a new legal chapter in 
the SCS disputes, the PCA decision was pathbreaking. It showed that none of the major 
claimants—China, Vietnam, or the Philippines—could claim 12 nautical miles of territorial sea 
or 200 nautical miles of an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the SCS due to historic fishing 
rights or land reclamation. The court’s ruling not only offered insight into how historic fishing 
rights are used by states to enforce closures and enclosures at sea, but also goes to the heart of 
the cartographic imagination of China and of one of its most vocal opponents—Vietnam—as 
both states claim virtually all of the sea features in the Paracels and Spratlys. 
 In both China and Vietnam, the SCS disputes evoke strong nationalist feelings along with 
a desire to include far-distant waters and largely submerged reefs and shoals within a bounded 
national space. Chinese and Vietnamese historians, archaeologists, journalists, and citizens in 
their home countries and abroad have called for consolidated efforts to clarify facts, standardize 
understanding, and provide scientific and historical evidence of China’s and Vietnam’s 
“motherland” and of their “indisputable sovereignty” over the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos.3 
In their claims to state sovereignty and treatment of the sea as land, China and Vietnam employ a 
rich arsenal of political strategies that help their citizens to imagine and identify with those 
remote reefs and rocks as part of their national territories (Roszko 2015). The “desire for 
mappability and the fear of unmappability (cartographic anxiety)” (Painter 2008, 349) animate 
man-made features, construction of artificial islands on the reefs, resettlement of fishers in 
disputed territories, state subsidies paid to fishers for their fishing operations in the Paracels and 
Spratlys, the establishment of the new Chinese administrative city of Sansha on the Paracels, and 
the practice of sending Vietnamese Buddhist monks to the Spratlys.4 Some of these strategies 
have been considered in terms of boundary delimitation, political development, and economic or 
military security (Bonnet 2012; Chemillier-Gendreau 2000; Tønnesson 2006; Hill, Owen, and 
Roberts 1991). However, seafaring narratives and fisheries as an object of analysis are rarely 
considered, despite being increasingly used for mapmaking and maritime territorialization 
(Roszko 2015). 
In this article, I shift the gaze from the geopolitical conflict between China and Vietnam 
to fishing communities and long-term connections, flows, and networks in the SCS. Historically, 
ideological and cultural flows of knowledge, beliefs, expertise, technology, and goods—whether 
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carried out by traders and seafarers on merchant ships or fishing junks—crossed vast ocean 
spaces and political boundaries, making the seas “unifying fields around which societies 
interacted” (Reid 1999, 39). For people living along the coast, the SCS always provided 
livelihoods from fishing, trade, and more: over centuries, different fishing communities, city 
ports, and urban markets formed multiple networks that linked up geographically distant coastal 
and maritime areas, straddling and transgressing borders without regard to the expansion of 
nation-states (Tagliacozzo 2009, 103). 
 With the early twentieth century’s concept of homogeneous bounded space replacing 
imperial understandings of unbounded space and territory (Callahan 2009, 141, 146), fishers 
have been inscribed into a cartographic order of the present-day nation-state (Winichakul 1994; 
Hill 1991). The legal regime of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) represents the largest 
enclosure in history, nationalizing vast expanses of ocean space and resources, and extending 
states’ national sovereignty beyond the limits of terrestrial jurisdiction. Yet, in the context of the 
highly fluid material nature of the sea—whether in terms of migratory fish species or sea features 
that cannot sustain human life—sovereignty at sea remains an unsettled and extractive practice 
that states construct not in isolation but in relation to one another. The unboundedness of the sea 
and of seaborne networks and flows generates territorial anxiety predicated on a historically 
recent understanding of territoriality as a constituent of state-spatial thinking represented and 
produced through cartographic technologies (Elden 2009, 2013; Painter 2008). Consequently, the 
spatial and temporal connectedness existing at sea must be tamed and turned into the productive 
tool of a grid map representing contemporary closures and enclosure. The assertion of bounded, 
defined space takes effect in public discourses: the SCS has come to be seen as exclusively 
“Chinese” or “Vietnamese” waters where fishers and their customary practices are placed at the 
center of China’s and Vietnam’s cartographic imaginations and territorial claims. 
 In those rapidly changing and fluid zones, the territorial conflict over the two 
archipelagos put fishers in the vanguard of national sovereignty in the SCS, or “East Sea” (V. 
Biển Đông), and linked them to the goals of “economic growth, regime and national security” 
(Wirth 2016, 79; Roszko 2015). In addition, territorial claims encourage Vietnamese and 
Chinese fishers to redefine their mental maps and historical narratives of fishing territories in line 
with cartographic discourses projected by their respective states—a process often overlooked by 
international relations analyses of the SCS (see Buszynski and Roberts 2015). Unpacking fishers’ 
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narratives of historical connections with the disputed areas of the Paracels and Spratlys requires a 
deeper understanding of how ethnic classifications came to signify national ones, and how they 
are used together with occupational categories to draw maritime boundaries between Vietnam 
and China. My primary aim here is not merely to reiterate the well-worn argument that fishing 
and trade networks existed long before nation-states, but rather to show how the old circulations 
in maritime zones have been appropriated and transformed by state and non-state actors to serve 
contemporary geopolitical claims. To fully recognize these circulations and the territorial 
anxieties they produce, one needs to pay attention to both contemporary projections about fishers 
by their states and “long-term patterns of mobility developed from a historical ecology, driven… 
by coastal societies” (Wheeler 2015, 34). Thus, I seek a broader perspective on the contemporary 
projection about fishers into the past, which overlays and conflates national and professional 
categories to serve the current narratives of the imagined sovereign territories of China and 
Vietnam. 
 Zooming in on coastal society and its mobility, I follow the trend among historians of 
underlining complex interrelationships and connections with regions themselves (Braudel 1995; 
Chaudhuri 1985; Hamashita 2008). While stressing maritime connections, networks, and 
transnational flows over vast oceans is not new, the political frame, administrative boundaries, 
and national histories still form the privileged units of historical analysis. In their seminal volume 
Asia Inside Out: Connected Places, anthropologist Helen Siu and historians Eric Tagliacozzo and 
Peter Perdue plead for attention to “the political ambiguities of these commercialized regions and 
the fluid cultural and political identities of those engaged with these places” (2015, 7). 
Maintaining the momentum of this plea (see Amrith 2013; Sheriff and Ho 2014; Hall 2011; Ho 
2006; Li 1998; Tagliacozzo and Chang 2011; Tagliacozzo, Siu, and Perdue 2015; Tran and Reid 
2006), I argue that narratives of fisheries in the SCS need to be liberated from abstract and 
anachronistic discourses of sovereignty, territoriality, and territorial anxieties that impose 
artificial boundaries in the form of monolithic ethnic categories and draw lines between littoral 
communities of Vietnam and China, despite their interconnected regional and occupational 
histories. Only then can we see the emerging “non-national actors, networks and movements” 
(Tran and Reid 2006, 4; see also Duara 1995; Krishna 1994; Sutherland 2014) spanning and 
transgressing diverse regions, islands, bays, and coasts across the SCS. 
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 This article is divided into three parts. The first section explores present-day seafaring 
narratives of Vietnam and China and current ways of imagining the SCS. The second section 
links this discussion to Cham seafaring narratives. The final section traces how the ethnic and 
national categories of Cham, Việt, and Han intersect and overlay professional categories—
including that of fisherman, trader, ship builder, sailor, and pirate—to produce an exclusive 
category of “Vietnamese” or “Chinese” fishers operating in the past. Interrogating these blurred 
categories, I conclude that such labels are used to produce particular political effects, in the form 




Map 1. The South China Sea: Lý Sơn Island in Vietnam and Tanmen and Sanya in China. 
Source: Base map available at http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and 
_asia/schina_sea_88.jpg; modified by Jutta Turner.  
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Connecting the South China Sea 
 Two locations where centuries-old customary arrangements of fishers have become a 
medium through which Vietnam and China can visualize the sea as state territory are Vietnam’s 
Lý Sơn Island and China’s Hainan Island. Historically, the SCS was open sea for local fishers 
(see, for example, Gutzlaff 1849; Lê Quý Đôn [1776] 2006; Horsburgh 1852), but this has 
changed, as both Lý Sơn and Hainan are marked by their governments as border areas and 
stepping-stones to the Paracels and Spratlys. In the strategic locations of Lý Sơn and Hainan, 
states organize and recruit fishermen into maritime militias and designate areas for their fishing 
operations. In China, fishing activities are projected as an element of economic growth, 
“opening” (C. kaifa), “protecting” (baohu), and “developing the ocean economy” (fazhan 
haiyang jingji); in Vietnam, fisheries become a patriotic symbol of defending “territorial 
sovereignty” (V. bảo vệ chủ quyền lãnh thổ) over the Paracels and Spratlys.5 
 In April 2014, seven years after my initial doctoral fieldwork in 2006 and 2007, I 
returned to Lý Sơn Island for four months of fieldwork. Lý Sơn is a small atoll, formerly named 
Cù Lao Ré, which is the Vietnamese pronunciation of the Malay word Pulao, meaning island 
(see map 1). Located about 16 nautical miles (ca. 30 km) offshore of Quảng Ngãi Province in 
Central Vietnam and 123 nautical miles (ca. 228 km) from the Paracel archipelago, Lý Sơn 
became a “putative symbol of ‘defending [Vietnam’s] sovereignty’ over the ‘East Sea’” (Roszko 
2016, 348). China’s repeated seizure of Lý Sơn fishing fleets and arrests of fishermen have been 
much publicized in the Vietnamese national media when relating the island’s historical seafaring 
legacy. In March 2015, I conducted another four months of ethnographic research in a few 
coastal locations of Hainan Island, including the fishing town of Tanmen in Qionghai County 
and a Cham neighborhood in the city of Sanya (map 1).6 Tanmen fishermen are the best-known 
maritime militia. They have been directly involved in major conflicts in the SCS (Zhang 2016) 
and are considered by the Chinese government to continue the “ancient tradition of cultivating 
the sea.” Less well known is the Cham community in Sanya and its historic connections with the 
SCS. While the seafaring legacy of Lý Sơn and Tanmen have gained much publicity in recent 
years, the Cham historical presence at sea is disregarded by both Vietnam and China—a point to 
which I will return later. 
Having the rare opportunity to spend time on both the Vietnamese and Chinese sides of 
the maritime border, I started my ethnographic immersion by looking more closely at how 
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fishers position themselves in the context of the recent geopolitical dispute and often informal 
marine trade between Vietnam and China. When asked directly whether they have any 
knowledge of the other or memory of their encounters at sea, Tanmen and Lý Sơn fishers usually 
denied that the “other side” was ever present in the Paracels or Spratlys. Yet, when asked 
indirectly about their seafaring experience, they would recall stories of their fathers and 
grandfathers running each other at sea and describe other encounters with dark-skinned seafarers 
wearing plain scarves around their heads (probably Cham or Malay sailors who were present 
there as well).7 
 Both groups, however, conveyed deep territorial anxiety over “the space of [national] 
desire” (Krishna 1994, 510) that is now the SCS. In China, the central and local state provides 
subsidies to Tanmen fishers, whose maritime operations stretch China’s borders across the 
Paracels and Spratlys; in Vietnam, Vietnamese citizens, rather than the government, donate 
money to encourage fishers to cling to the sea and their fishing grounds to defend national 
sovereignty (V. bám ngư trường để bảo vệ chủ quyền tổ quốc) (Roszko 2016, 369). The 
economic incentives extended to Chinese fishers and the narratives about Vietnamese fishers 
allegedly victimized by Chinese vessels produce not only asymmetric relations between the two 
countries and fishing groups, but also different anxieties that are manifested, calmed, and 
translated into desires and hopes (Broers and Toal 2013; Krishna 1994; Painter 2008). As a 
result, these anxieties function like a mirror, distorting old fishing arrangements by making them 
mutually exclusive to fit a narrow image of national territorial claims. 
 
Navigating the South China Sea 
Recently, China has been replacing traditional wooden fishing vessels with steel-hulled 
trawlers equipped with high-tech navigational and communication systems. These boats are 
believed to extend the imagined national geo-body—composed of both territory and nation 
(Winichakul 1994)—to cover stretches of the SCS. However, until the mid-1980s, the mobility 
of fishers in Tanmen and Lý Sơn was severely restricted by the states. While Tanmen fishers 
often relied on maps obtained during earlier sea voyages to Singapore, in Lý Sơn, fishers used 
simple administration maps stolen from the local People’s Committee office when commencing 
their daring journeys to the Paracels and Spratlys at the beginning of the 1980s. At the time, 
when navigation and nautical charts were not available, Tanmen fishers relied on local 
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navigational knowledge passed from father to son, sometimes in the form of a “logbook.” In 
those family logbooks men recorded time, distance, currents, tides, the position of stars, passing 
birds, and many other details observed during their sea voyages. In traditional navigation, geng 
was an important term used to measure distance by many Hainanese sailors. One geng is 
equivalent to 60 Chinese miles (li), but one full day from morning to midnight would be equal to 
approximately 10 geng. As Tanmen fishers explained, they used the “geng method” together 
with a few lighted incense sticks to calculate the time and direction of their passage on the sea. 
Since sailing to the Paracels required their boats to move on a zigzag course to avoid hidden 
rocks, the sailors followed the information in their logbooks and their own experience to 
calculate how many incense sticks had to be burned before each turn. Today, these logbooks, 
known in China as Geng lu bu (Manual of sea routes), are used by the Chinese government as 
evidence of a long-standing Chinese presence in the disputed archipelagos and “ironclad proof of 
China’s sovereignty over the South China Sea,” even though the traditional navigational 
knowledge was not unique to Tanmen fishers.8 Lý Sơn sailors also kept records of their voyages 
to the Paracels and Spratlys and measured distance with incense sticks, as did Tanmen and many 
fishers in the region, before nautical charts came into widespread use. 
Most of the time, however, fishers tried to convince me that Chinese or Vietnamese, 
depending on which group they came from, were the “only group” to have, since “time 
immemorial,” the intimate knowledge needed to reach their “ancestral waters.” For example, 
when I asked Lý Sơn villagers about the presence of Hainan fishers in the area of the two 
archipelagos, one fisherman quickly shook his head and replied: 
 
According to the ancient historical books, from the period of the Nguyễn Lords 
[1558–1777] until the King Gia Long [1762–1820], the Paracels (V. Hoàng Sa) 
and Spratlys (V. Trường Sa) belonged to Vietnam. As for China at that time, 
Chinese from Hainan Island could only go down up to 12 nautical miles, certainly 
could not go down to the Paracels, because the Paracels belonged to Vietnam. 
Hainan people did not have such favorable wind to go to the Paracels as Lý Sơn 
people had. They only fished close to Hainan or in the Tonkin Gulf. 
 
One Tanmen resident was equally ungenerous in his opinion: 
 
If Vietnamese people go to the Paracels (C. Xisha) or the Spratlys (C. Nansha), 
they learned [how to do so] from Tanmen people. In the past they did not have 
any boats; they had just bamboo basket-boats (C. luo kuan; V. ghe bầu). 
 Roszko  27 
 
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 
E-Journal No. 21 (December 2016) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-21) 
 
Note that the Lý Sơn fisherman referred to territorial waters as defined by the 1982 United 
Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which extended a belt of coastal waters 
up to 12 nautical miles.9 He projected a current legal concept into the past to explain why Hainan 
sailors could not go to the Paracels. He also claimed an advantage over Hainan as a result of Lý 
Sơn’s geographical location. In turn, the Tanmen villager disparaged the maritime knowledge 
and navigation skills of Vietnamese fishers by pointing to the technological inferiority of their 
boats compared to Tanmen boats. 
But one needs to be careful about taking these pejorative remarks as absolute and as 
defining the relationship between Chinese and Vietnamese fishers. Referring to their more recent 
interactions (C. jiao liu; V. giao lưu) at sea, Tanmen and Lý Sơn men told me in detail that they 
used sign language to communicate with one another; exchanged cigarettes, food, fuel, and water; 
and helped one another in times of disaster. Young Tanmen fishermen proudly showed off their 
knowledge of a few Vietnamese words that they had learned when Vietnamese fishermen invited 
them on board to share a meal and a glass of rice liquor. They repeated a Vietnamese invitation 
to eat—ăn cơm! (literally, “Eat rice!”)—back to me, exactly as learned from their Vietnamese 
hosts. Another example of how Chinese and Vietnamese fishers perceive each other comes from 
a Tanmen woman who stayed in the Paracels for over a year to be closer to her husband, whose 
trawler operated between the disputed archipelagos for more than two months at a stretch. She 
told me that she often saw Vietnamese fishing boats anchored in the vicinity of the Paracels, 
their crews busily collecting sea cucumbers. She said, “They are fishers like we are, and they 
need to earn their living too, so we do not disturb each other.” Her statement made more sense to 
me when I learned that the sea cucumbers collected by the Vietnamese often end up in Tanmen’s 
traditional marine pharmaceuticals. The sea not only divides but, more importantly, connects the 
Tanmen and Lý Sơn fisheries through the collection of and trade in many marine products used 
for tourist souvenirs, jewelry and decoration, and traditional medicine. Unseen by customs, 
endangered species are directly transferred from Vietnamese to Chinese fishing vessels at sea or 
transported by Sino-Vietnamese traders to Guangxi or Guangdong Province. The collection and 
trade in these goods might take place on a relatively small scale, but they nevertheless link the 
Chinese and Vietnamese economies, as the economic value of “rare” and “exotic” marine 
products increases along with demand in a situation of ecological deterioration. 
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These ethnographic examples reveal different patterns of Vietnamese-Chinese interaction 
and people’s “micro-strategies” (Chan 2013, 123) for navigating the sea border. Political 
scientist Hongzhou Zhang (2016, 69) observes that, although the 2014 Sino-Vietnamese 981 oil 
rig row involved both Chinese and Vietnamese fishing boats, many Tanmen fishermen refused 
the Chinese government’s request that they defend the oil rig installed in Vietnam’s exclusive 
economic zone.10 Similarly, the head of the Tanmen fishing organization—whom I interviewed 
in March 2015—said that Vietnamese and Chinese fishers had friendly relations and that if 
violent clashes happened they usually involved “army people.” In her studies on Vietnamese-
Chinese relations in the borderlands, anthropologist Yuk Wah Chan (2013, 123) made clear that 
people living on the margins need to be pragmatic in seeking their livelihood, while those “in the 
center fight for the ideology of sovereignty and national pride.” Territorial anxieties are part of 
this process, but they also express a whole spectrum of fears connected with both making a 
living and the desired image of the national territory. 
 
The Cham Seafaring Narratives 
Between 1993 and 1994, under the direction of the late prime minister Võ Văn Kiệt, 
Vietnamese archaeologists carried out excavations on the Spratly archipelago, including in the 
islets of Namyit (V. Đảo Nam Yết), Sin Cowe (V. Đảo Sơn Cả), and Sand Cay (V. Đảo Sinh 
Tổn). The artifacts, mainly ceramic, that they discovered were dated to the Early Iron Age. This 
would hardly be considered an archeological revelation were it not for the recent increase in 
scientific and official interest in the SCS, in which all historical and cultural relics are potentially 
useful. In search of the national past of the SCS, Vietnamese archaeologist Lại Văn Tới ascribed 
the artifacts from the Spratlys to the Sa Huỳnh culture—a distinct Bronze Age culture of 
Austronesian seafarers who flourished in central and southern Vietnam between 1000 B.C. and 
200 A.D.—as “the very priceless materials to prove Vietnam sovereignty and territorial waters” 
(2015, 70). Furthermore, Lại Văn Tới classified the articles as “early Champa culture,” affirming 
“that about 2,000 to 2,500 years ago, ancient Vietnamese people already conquered, inhabited, 
possessed and exploited [Spratly] archipelagos inside Vietnam’s territorial waters in [the] East 
Sea” (2015, 53). Considering that only in the seventeenth century did Champa and its 
Austronesian-speaking inhabitants became part of the Việt polity through gradual southward 
expansion and colonization, such use of archeology is a good example of how, by extension of 
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national time and space, “Vietnamese identity” is projected far into the past and onto people who 
were not part of the contemporary nation-state. 
 In early Southeast Asia, the Cham were known not only as skillful seafarers and 
successful merchants but also as “pirates” (Hall 2011), due to their naval raids on coastal areas. 
Between the seventh and fifteenth centuries they established their rule over coastal plains and 
mountain zones in what is now south-central Vietnam. The Cham never formed a unified 
kingdom, and their naval attacks on the coast drew on ethnically diverse maritime people (Hall 
2011, 80). In the fifteenth century, Champa was invaded by Đại Việt—the name of the Việt 
polity at the time—which gradually took control of the entire Cham territory; only in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were the Nguyễn lords able to establish their power in the 
South. The civil war of the Nguyễn with the Trịnh lords (1627–1672 and 1774–1775), which 
divided Vietnam into northern and southern realms, created conditions for Việt migrants living in 
the new land to form their own distinct way of life. Central Vietnam was part of the southern 
realm and provided an option for northern Vietnamese migrants who, driven by lack of land, 
famine, internal conflict, and struggles for power, were seeking a better life elsewhere. Asia 
historian Tana Li (1998) points out that the Việt who arrived in the seventeenth century had to 
settle in a different environment and engage with Cham communities. Their gradual extension 
into new areas in the South led migrants to escape domination by the northern court in the Red 
River Delta, and to adopt local elements like Cham deities or spirit cults, which were free from 
Confucian restrictions (Li 1998, 101–116). Vietnamese migrants colonizing the old Cham 
territory worshiped tutelary spirits that they had never worshiped in their places of origin. The 
new experience of the sea, the encounter with the unfamiliar Cham civilization, and interethnic 
marriages produced quite different patterns from those of northern Vietnam (Li 1998). 
 Therefore, casting light on regional narratives of the SCS within present-day Vietnam 
and China requires a closer look at the seafaring experience of Vietnamese, Cham, and Chinese, 
who must not be viewed as discrete groups (Wheeler 2006). The unique navigation skills of Lý 
Sơn sailors capitalized precisely on seafaring techniques of their Cham predecessors. Prior to the 
Việt arrival on Lý Sơn in the seventeenth century, the island was part of the Cham network of 
ports and trading systems in the SCS that connected the Middle East with Africa and China (see 
Reid 1999, 43).11 The Cham trading networks also included Hainan Island and Guangzhou, where 
Cham merchant communities have existed for over a thousand years (Thurgood 1999, 227), 
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interacting and engaging in commerce with Chinese as well as Arab, Persian, Jewish, and Indian 
merchants, many of whom formed settlements in southern China. 
 When I visited one of the two Cham neighborhoods located outside Sanya city, I 
encountered people who clearly pointed out that their ancestors came from Vietnam and believed 
that they speak the same language as their Cham fellows in Vietnam. When asked why their 
ancestors left Vietnam, some said that they had been caught in storms at sea and could not find 
their way back. Others, appearing uneasy, lowered their voices and gave the war with the Việt 
and their inability to defend themselves as reasons for their migration. An eighty-three-year-old 
Cham man (b. 1933) asked why, if the typhoon had been a genuine reason for their arrival in 
Hainan, the Cham wanted to stay on the island instead of returning to Vietnam? He gave the 
following account of this bitter experience: 
 
One thousand years ago, consumed by flames of fire and covered with clouds of 
smoke, the Việt (Yuenan) territory was plunged into the chaos of war. The cities 
were swept by death, political affairs were paralyzed, and [Cham] lives hardened 
as their property was taken away. When in those oppressive years their faith 
started to fade they left [Vietnam] without hope of returning. Women, old men, 
and children took a long and difficult path,… driven aimlessly by the sea into the 
far corners of the earth…. 
 Those wandering Muslims arrived in a mysterious, depopulated, and 
backward place where the environment was harsh…. They arrived at the Asian 
coastline that had a huge bay on the west side of Plum Mountains (Sanya). 
Exploring the sea and its paths and depth many times they finally settled down, 
built up their fortune, established business and maintained their livelihoods…. 
 Taking roots in this deserted and wild territory, Huizu [Chinese Muslims] 
were born from the wind and rain and from the sweat as they worked at sea.… 
Generation after generation, dynasty after dynasty, they sacrificed themselves and 
endured heavy and difficult social transformations. They are the family that was 
broken up and its members dispersed. Put to the severe test, after all that, they did 
not surround and assimilate or allow themselves to be fear-stricken, because their 
[Muslim] identity is in their blood and sustains their fight to improve their lives. 
 
According to linguists Graham Thurgood, Ela Thurgood, and Li Fengxiang (2006, 20), Sanya 
functioned as a port on the Cham trade route between southern China and Annam (central 
Vietnam) until the fall of Vijaya in the fifteenth century. This suggests that the Cham refugees 
must have been aware of Sanya before making it their new home. However, the old man later 
said that Sanya was not the only entry point to the trading route and that different groups of 
Cham refugees had entered Hainan at several other points on the coast, including Wanning, 
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Danzhou, and Lingshui. While today the Cham occupy only two neighborhoods, in the past their 
settlements were scattered widely along the Hainan shore (Thurgood, Thurgood, and Li 2006, 
24). Like other fishing groups in southern China or in Vietnam, they were landless and buried 
their dead on the beach, a practice that has survived among Hainan Cham until the present day. 
While stressing their Muslim tradition and Vietnam as a place of their ancestors’ origin, some 
Cham in Sanya confessed their Chinese, Arab, and Malay heritage. They also openly stated that 
some of their ancestors who settled in Danzhou, Wanning, or Lingshui intermingled with local 
populations and gradually became Han. 
 Thurgood, Thurgood, and Li (2006, 24) note that fishing and trade were always the main 
economic bases of the Cham in Hainan. They refer to a tablet from 1753, which was deciphered 
by a Chinese scholar in front of the mosque in Sanya in 1981. The tablet recorded the Yazhou 
government’s decision in a legal dispute over control of sea fishing grounds—apparently in favor 
of the Cham (Thurgood, Thurgood, and Li 2006, 24). The Cham elder confirmed that, indeed, 
trade and fishing were important activities for centuries, but he also explained that this changed 
after the Japanese invasion of Hainan (1939–1945), when Cham homes, mosques, fishing 
equipment, and boats were destroyed, putting considerable strain on their livelihoods. During the 
land reform of 1950 to 1953, the local authorities distributed land among Cham, organized them 
into production units, and trained them to farm, while limiting their fishing-based economy to 
shallow sea areas. He also mentioned that, a few years later, the land that had been given to them 
was taken away again. Today, the Cham people in Sanya engage in a wide array of business 
activities, rather than farming. Some men work as rickshaw drivers, and many families own 
small restaurants, food stalls, or shops selling daily requisites. Many young Cham men and 
women are well educated and work as teachers or office clerks. Fishing has become more of an 
economic sideline than a main source of income. Yet I always find a number of Cham men on 
the coast busy with building new or improving old fishing boats, cleaning nets, and setting out on 
their night fishing trips. 
 Hainan has long been outside effective Chinese control, being inhabited by different 
groups such as the Cham, a maritime and mobile people who, through trade, connected China and 
Southeast Asia with the Arab world. Nowadays, China assigns these maritime people the all-
encompassing label of “Chinese fishers,” while the Cham’s long-standing presence at sea is 
silenced. In the case of Vietnam, the Cham heritage comes in handy for formulating nationalist 
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claims of ancient differentiation from China without acknowledging the Cham maritime legacy 
on its own terms. In Lý Sơn, the Việt were the latest residents in the island’s long history of 
settlement, and the Cham presence prior to their arrival in the seventeenth century still creates 
anxiety among Việt about their identity and rights over the land (Roszko 2016, 354). Southeast 
Asia historian Anthony Reid points out that the Cham remain “an embarrassment” to Vietnamese 
nationalism and “a reminder that borders have not always been where they came to rest in the 
colonial era, and that group identities were by no means fixed or immutable” (1999, 40). Thus, 
for Vietnam, more than for China, the Cham remain a source of deep territorial anxiety, which 
impels the state to project them as just an “ancient civilization,” completely ignoring their 
seafaring legacy and interconnections in present-day national narratives of the SCS. While 
colonial maps of Cochinchina are often used by nationalists as the tool of modern and “objective” 
knowledge (Roszko 2015, 2016; Sasges 2016), those cartographic images that refer to “Champa” 
sit uncomfortably in the social memory of Vietnam and its society, which expanded southward 
through the pacification of the Cham territory into the Khmer realm. 
 
Việt, Cham, and Han beyond the Nation 
According to local narratives, the forefathers of Tanmen residents came mostly from the 
southern province of Fujian during the Song dynasty. When asked about their origins, Tanmen 
fishers claimed Han descent and distinguished themselves from the other fishing groups in the 
village, namely the Dan-jia (Tanka). Dan-jia is a term for boat dwellers who traditionally lived 
in floating villages in coastal parts of southern China and northern Vietnam. Although partly 
sedentarized by the Chinese government, the Dan-jia remain to this day a despised group at the 
bottom of the local social hierarchy. Even though the Dan-jia in Tanmen might have been there 
for two generations, they are considered migrant fishers in contrast to those who claim long-term 
settlement. As anthropologists Helen Siu and Liu Zhiwei (2006) argue in the case of the Pearl 
River Delta, it could be that the Tanmen’s forefathers were of Dan-jia origin but, over time, 
through land reclamation, commerce, shipbuilding, and military service to the state, became 
sedentarized, simultaneously assuming new identities. By calling themselves Han, they 
distinguished themselves not only from later arrivals but also from the indigenous population in 
the area, namely the Li—the earliest-known inhabitants of Hainan, who historically made a 
living by fishing, hunting, and trading (Csete 2006; see also Siu and Zhiwei 2006, 290). 
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A similar process occurred in Lý Sơn, where in the seventeenth century landless peasants 
and disadvantaged fishers arrived from the poverty-stricken northern coast of Vietnam (see 
Roszko 2016). However, neither Fujian nor Vietnamese migrants who came to Tanmen or Lý 
Sơn established themselves on empty soil; rather, they had to assimilate and interact with other 
communities who were already there. To this day, the older Cham generation in Hainan has 
retained close trading relations with the Li, and both groups are fluent in each other’s languages. 
However, young Cham people who rarely interact with the Li are losing their parents’ or 
grandparents’ multilingualism. Instead, most of these young people negotiate their ethnic, 
religious, and national identities via global Islam, regional Muslim links, and the dominant Han 
Chinese.12 
Recently, scholars of China have been taking a revisionist look at the problem of 
representation and identity in China by unpacking the historical relationship of the pre-
nineteenth-century category of “Han” vis-à-vis its contemporary conception (Gladney 2004; 
Mullaney et al. 2012). In his critical study of the idea of Han versus regional identities of 
Cantonese people within China, anthropologist Kevin Carrico describes the Han minzu (Han 
nationality) as “a massive melting pot, attempting to join peoples with vastly different local 
identities, customs, and dialects under a singular and one-dimensional label” (2012, 24). While 
the idea of the Han ren (Han person) existed for centuries as a culturists’ label for the 
descendants of the Han dynasty, the notion of Han minzu as a homogeneous and singular ethnic 
identity is an invention that goes back to the nineteenth century, when the Qing empire became 
the present-day Chinese nation-state (Gladney 2004, 14). 
Like the Han category in China, the idea of “Vietnameseness” enjoys a powerful and 
hegemonic position in Vietnam. I have written elsewhere that the idea of “Vietnameseness” 
dismisses regional, historical, and cultural differences and sidelines places such as Lý Sơn Island 
that do not represent the imagined culture of northern Vietnam (Roszko 2016, 352). Parallel to 
trends in scholarship on China, historians of Vietnam recently have pointed out different ways of 
acting Vietnamese that have existed across space and time (Taylor 1998, 2013; Li 1998, 2006; 
Tran and Reid 2006). Li contends that the Việt occupation of the land to the south in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was not a replacement of Cham culture and civilization 
with Vietnamese, but rather a “fruitful interaction ended by creating a new way of being 
Vietnamese” (Li 1998, 99). Lý Sơn villagers who embraced a rich array of ethnic and 
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professional categories—as they intermingled with the Cham and engaged in sailing, pillaging, 
shipbuilding, trading, and fishing—are a living example of this dynamic process. 
 
Fishers, Seafarers, Traders, and Pirates 
 At present, fluidity of ethnic and professional categories is rarely considered in the 
national seafaring narratives of Chinese and Vietnamese fishers. The people who are today called 
fishers often also functioned in the past as shipbuilders, sailors, traders, and pirates: spatial and 
temporal categories enacted in particular situations and contexts. These professional categories 
were always relational and situational rather than ontological. The label “pirate” was repeatedly 
attached to others, even though seafaring, fishery, trade, and piracy had always represented 
connected sea-oriented economies that did not recognize or respect political boundaries (Murray 
1987; Warren 1981; Wheeler 2015). 
 In the last few years the Vietnamese party-state has become directly engaged in 
recovering and preserving local traditions and documents related to the Paracel (Hoàng Sa) and 
Spratly (Trường Sa) flotillas, which, from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, played an 
important role in exploiting the SCS under the Nguyễn lords and the Nguyễn dynasty, 
respectively (Roszko 2016). In most cases, a large number of skillful seamen were recruited from 
Lý Sơn Island, but the royal court in Huế also sought to involve the experienced Cham seafarers, 
who were rewarded with exemption from taxes (Bộ Ngoại Giao 2013, 10–11). This confirms 
Kenneth Hall’s argument that the very same people could be engaged in different sea economies 
and sometimes turned to the service of the state (2011, 80). According to a preserved document 
of the Cham in Phu Quý Island (map 1), three vessels with Cham “fishermen,” who were 
probably skillful sailors, shipbuilders, and traders, were launched to the Paracels and Spratlys at 
the command of King Minh Mạng (1791–1841) to mark the sea routes (Bộ Ngoại Giao 2013, 
10–11). 
In the seventeenth century, the Qing government (1644–1912) in China lifted its ban on 
maritime trade. The Dutch and other Europeans recognized lucrative trade opportunities and 
gradually replaced the Chinese in the trade sector in Southeast Asia (Schottenhammer 2012, 84–
85). Believing in the existence of a mythical long archipelago, Wan-li-Shi-tang, that blocked the 
direct route to Southeast Asia, Chinese merchants closely followed the coast of what today is 
Vietnam (Ptak 2006; see also Hayton 2015, 43). By contrast, European ships recklessly cut 
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through the center of the SCS to find a direct route between Southeast Asian and Chinese ports. 
Crashing on the reefs, they incurred losses for their trading companies but provided others, such 
as the seafaring community of Lý Sơn or the Cham from Phu Quý, with opportunities to eke out 
a living. The recovery of gold, silver, swords, ivory, porcelain, cloth, wax, and many other goods 
from the Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese, or British wrecks was so profitable that Lý Sơn sailors 
were granted a royal concession to salvage the cargos. The spoils—often supplemented with 
catches of mother-of-pearl, snails, tortoises, and sea cucumbers—were handed over to the royal 
court in Huế (Lê Quý Đôn [1776] 2006, 155). Besides being exempted from taxes, the sailors 
received some monetary reward and were allowed to keep a large part of the harvested marine 
goods for their own profit (Lê Quý Đôn [1776] 2006, 155; see also Roszko 2016). 
On the other side of the SCS, Hainanese seafarers ventured into the Paracels and Spratlys 
to procure sea cucumbers, tortoiseshells, shark fins, giant clams, and sea snails. The eighteenth-
century Vietnamese historian Lê Quý Đôn (Lê Quy Đôn [1776] 2006, 82b–85a, in Nguyễn 2008) 
noted the immediate proximity of Hainan Island to the Paracels and the friendly relations 
between the Paracel and Hainanese sailors who encountered each other in the archipelago. Lê 
Quý Đôn was not the only one who commented on the friendly interactions between sailors from 
Hainan and Vietnam. The presence of Hainanese sailors and lightly armed boats from Annam in 
the archipelago was also noted by a German missionary, who, in the mid-nineteenth century, 
traveled across East and Southeast Asia (Gutzlaff 1849). Around the same time, a Scottish 
hydrographer, James Horsburgh, recorded that some local seafarers from Hainan were 
undertaking fishing voyages lasting up to two months and stretching as far as 700 or 800 miles 
into the SCS (1852, 346). Collecting sea cucumbers, tortoiseshells, and other marine goods, they 
freely navigated their hardwood vessels between numerous reefs, shoals, and sandbanks of the 
Paracels and Spratlys in the SCS. While these rocks and reefs were a deadly hazard for 
Europeans, for Cham, Việt, and Hainanese seafarers they were part of their livelihood, which 
was based on maritime knowledge, navigation skills, and trade. During my conversation with 
Tanmen fishers, many recalled stories of their forefathers’ voyages to the two archipelagos. It 
was not rare to take a buffalo along in order to graze it on the grassier islets of the Paracels and 
spend more than a month there fishing for turtles and sea snails and waiting for the collected sea 
cucumbers to dry in the sun. 
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The precolonial and colonial sources are repeatedly cited as proof of Vietnamese 
sovereignty, but when read in their entirety they demonstrate instead that for neo-Confucian 
Vietnam and China, sovereignty was about people, not territories (Sasges 2016; Hill 1991). 
Therefore, rather than discussing whether the colonial sources confirm or deny Vietnamese or 
Chinese sovereignty over the disputed territories, I want to draw attention to the detail, in 
Gutzlaff’s passage, that fishers from both Annam (present-day Central Vietnam) and Hainan 
were historically present in the Paracels and Spratlys. The German missionary described this as 
follows: 
From time immemorial, junks in large number from Haenan [sic], have annually 
visited all these shoals and proceeded in their excursions as far as the coast of 
Borneo. Though more than ten per cent. are annually wrecked, the quantity of fish 
taken is so great as to ensure all loss, and still leave a very good profit. The 
Annam government, perceiving the advantages which it might derive if a toll 
were raised, keeps revenue cutters and a small garrison on the spot to collect the 
duty on all visitors, and to ensure protection to its own fishermen. A considerable 
intercourse has thus gradually been established, and promises to grow in 
importance on account of the abundance of fish which come to these banks to 
spawn. Some islets bear a [sic] stunted vegetation, but fresh water is wanting; and 
those sailors who neglect to take with them a good supply are often put to great 
straits (Gutzlaff 1849, 93). 
 
The elderly residents of Tanmen and Lý Sơn whom I spoke with considered the two archipelagos 
to be their traditional fishing grounds and underlined their own cosmopolitan status as traders. 
Lý Sơn people explained that their ancestors ventured into the Paracels and Spratlys before the 
royal court in Huế found out about their profitable salvage of the wrecked ships and, ultimately, 
ordered them to formalize their activities as the Paracel and Spratly flotillas. Referring to the 
SCS dispute, they also said that—whether or not the Vietnamese government would provide 
financial or military support for their fishing fleets—the islanders were determined to continue 
their operations in those areas, because this was how they had always earned their livelihood 
(Roszko 2016, 364). 
 
Fishing and Pillaging 
Historian Robert Antony (2014) provides a fascinating case study of a little-known pirate, 
Yang Yandi (V. Dương Ngan Địch), who in the seventeenth century operated in the Sino-
Vietnamese water frontier of the Gulf of Tonkin and was considered a rebel by the Qing court, 
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but a hero by the Nguyễn lords in southern Vietnam. Roberts observed that, “given the hectic, 
uncertain conditions, sharp distinctions between trade, smuggling and piracy were always 
blurry” (2014, 8). Moreover, switching loyalty from Việt to Chinese or vice versa was a common 
practice (Tagliacozzo 2009; Sellers 1983). Periodically, organized piracy, plundering, or 
smuggling—which could sometimes be turned into formalized trade—fit the description of 
various profitable activities undertaken in the past by Lý Sơn and Hainan seafarers. Historically, 
these activities constituted an important part of local life and economy and supplemented fishing. 
For Lý Sơn sailors, the salvaged cargos from wrecked European merchant ships offered a good 
profit, while for Hainan residents, the abundance of rich shipments passing the east coast of 
Hainan represented easy prey and a boost to their livelihood. Already during the Song dynasty 
(960–1279), many foreign merchants were captured and enslaved by powerful Hainanese 
chieftains of various hill tribes (Chiu 2004, 230). But it was the maritime trade proscription by 
the Ming government (1368–1644) that intensified piracy, which—with the interruption of 
private foreign trade—became endemic on Hainan (Schottenhammer 2012; Calanca 2001). The 
Qing court restored the maritime trade, but the problem of piracy persisted in spite of the Qing’s 
aggressive policy of interdiction and punishment and—when that failed—pacification. 
 A report of the expedition to Hainan by British consul Robert Swinhoe dated June 13, 
1868, made clear that some of the small harbors formed by reefs and lagoons on the east and 
southwest side of Hainan provided excellent hiding places for pirate junks and their crews, who 
seasonally also engaged in fishing. Known in British logbooks as Guangdong or Pulo Canton, Lý 
Sơn Island was also considered a dangerous and inaccessible place for ships to anchor due to the 
coral reef and rocks surrounding its coast (White 1824, 75), and it was thus a perfect location for 
those elements labeled “pirates” by Europeans. Europeans considered Lý Sơn Island a key 
marker on their way to Guangdong, before they used the sea-lane through the Macclesfield Bank. 
They needed to have the island on their right side; otherwise, they could run dangerously 
aground at the Paracels.13 For example, on June 27, 1839, a French merchant ship was stranded 
and submerged in the Paracels. The eleven crew members reached the Đà Nẵng port on small 
boats and called out for help. The port authorities sent the Hoàng Sa navy to bring the rest of the 
crew to safety, and the case was reported to King Minh Mạng (Bộ Ngoại Giao 2013, 80). 
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Shipbuilding and Trade 
Historically, Lý Sơn and Tanmen were sites of local shipbuilding, which required 
considerable maritime knowledge and seafaring skills. The basket boat—mocked by one of the 
Tanmen villagers above—was highly popular up to the nineteenth century in southern Vietnam, 
but its style was borrowed from the Cham (Li 1998, 112; Pham 2013). The Cham themselves 
were influenced by Malays and Arabs with whom they traded in the region. The Cham boats I 
have seen on the Sanya shore were often described by ethnic Chinese as “primitive,” because 
they were built from light material such as planks, bamboo, and Styrofoam. However, I would 
argue that they reflect long-term experience on the sea and genuine skill in blending various 
technologies. The bamboo planks in the Cham boats were sewn together with rope without using 
nails, a shipbuilding technique typical of traditional Arab dhows used in the Indian Ocean (see 
Sheriff 2010).14 Historian and maritime archeologist Charlotte Pham (2013) points out that 
Chinese boatbuilding was influenced by Southeast Asian ships, but technological evolutions—as 
the examples above show—were complex and multidimensional. This suggests that fishers in 
Hainan and Vietnam were not a homogeneous group and that their language, customs, and 
fishing junks differed from group to group. Commenting on one of the fishing groups in 
southwest Hainan in 1868, Swinhoe wrote that “the fishermen were the most barbarous we have 
seen on this coast, many of them perfectly naked. Their boats were constructed very like the 
Japanese boats at Nagasaki” (1868, 13). 
Regardless of exactly who those fishers were, boatbuilding was a “repository of cultural 
and technological exchanges but also a cradle of and source of interconnectedness” (Pham 2013, 
162). Procuring the timber for constructing their junks required Lý Sơn and Tanmen residents to 
undertake sea voyages along Vietnam’s coast and interact with other communities. Historically, 
it was common practice for Hainan sojourning seafarers to take local wives in Vietnam, 
Indonesia, or Thailand to facilitate trade and communication. Using their local networks, these 
seafarers cut timber in Champa (known as Annam, or present-day Central Vietnam) and 
Cambodia and then bought an additional quantity in Bangkok, where they would spend up to two 
months building junks. These junks, loaded with rice, would return to Hainan or Canton, where 
they would be sold for good profit together with their cargos (Gutzlaff 1834, 82–83). Since the 
rice grown was insufficient to meet the needs of the Tanmen population, marine goods, 
livestock, raw sugar, betel nut, rattan, incense timber, and medical plants were also traded to 
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Southeast Asian countries, including Cochin-China, Singapore, and Siam (see Michalk 1985, 
121; Csete 2006, 229), to provide income for buying rice. 
As in the case of Tanmen, Lý Sơn people continued to capitalize on their seafaring 
capacity when the flotillas ceased their naval activities in the Paracels and Spratlys. Following 
the cold winter monsoon, they sailed to the south, where they traded salt and local products such 
as fish sauce, peanut oil, and fishing nets. Waiting for the southern summer monsoon, they 
would offer themselves as seasonal labor to rich French and Chinese people. The income they 
earned was used to purchase rice that was shipped back to Lý Sơn (Roszko 2016; see also Li 
2004). En route home, Lý Sơn sailors would take on board Cham traders of medicinal plants, 
which were in great demand on the island. 
Reflecting on the mobility and skills of Lý Sơn or Tanmen people, we could say that the 
occupational roles they embraced did not rest exclusively on fishing and shipbuilding; seafaring 
and trade came in handy at all times. The blurred lines and fluidity between professions and 
ethnicity problematize conceptualizations of a monolithic Chinese or Vietnamese nation and 
culture (Evans 2002). Probing into the past requires giving up “the distorting lens of the nation” 
(Evans 2002, 159) and bringing to light many pasts that were driven by both ecology and people 
(Taylor and Whitmore 1995). 
 
Conclusion 
 My aim in this article is not to legitimize or delegitimize the territorial claims of Vietnam 
and China to the SCS but to engage with national and territorial cartographic anxieties from a 
different angle. I built my ethnography of fisheries in the SCS beyond the nation-state frame on 
maritime Asia historian Charles Wheeler’s idea (2006) of connecting the usually separated 
histories of the Cham, Vietnamese, and Chinese. In both Vietnam and China, the seafaring legacy 
of the Cham and their trading system in the SCS are rarely mentioned in relation to fishers, who 
nowadays figure so prominently in mediated state discourses. The passionate narrative given by 
the Cham elder in Sanya reveals that probing into Lý Sơn and Tanmen fishers’ experience at sea 
requires taking account of the cosmopolitan histories and voices of various Cham people who 
were present through centuries within the same space and time. Lý Sơn and Hainan fishers did 
not exist in a social vacuum, nor were their communities static and homogeneous; rather, they 
were, in Tagliacozzo’s words, “part of a larger, maritime nexus, linked by religion, trade and a 
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cosmopolitan outlook” (2009 100; see also Wheeler 2006; Roszko 2016). These historical 
patterns in the form of mobility and commercial networks persisted among different coastal 
communities, though the latter-day connection of fisheries to sovereignty and state security is a 
strategy of these marginalized societies for claiming economic benefits within the state system 
(see Siu and Zhiwei 2006). In the case of Tanmen and Lý Sơn, I argue that the Chinese and 
Vietnamese fishers’ territorial anxieties around the issue of who had the maritime skills and 
knowledge to go to the Paracels and Spratlys are also a facet of broader cartographic and national 
anxieties over who has legitimate rights to the sea and whose seafaring legacy deserves to be 
mapped and remembered. More importantly, territorial anxieties show uneven and asymmetric 
relationships between Vietnam and China and different levels of interaction, through which state 
and non-state actors seek to pursue their ideologically and economically motivated desires and 
goals. 
 Rather than being proof of hostile attitudes or eternal friendship, the contradictory 
narratives and reluctance of Chinese and Vietnamese to openly acknowledge each other’s long-
standing presence and interactions at sea touch on the problem of how fishers are politically and 
economically implicated in the current geopolitical conflict in the SCS. In the process, the 
monolithic categories of Việt and Han come to mark the newly rediscovered national territory of 
remote rocks, shoals, sandbanks, and reefs—maritime frontiers of Vietnam and China that did 
not exist in the same way before the invention of the Global Positioning System (GPS). Ever 
since then, it has been possible for states to claim remote stretches of the sea and their maritime 
features. Along with the official rhetoric concerning the development of marine resources 
through the modernization of fishing fleets, the putative historical presence of fishers and their 
customary practices in the SCS are increasingly used by China and Vietnam as legal arguments 
in contemporary territorial claims, while ignoring the centuries-old presence of other seafaring 
communities such as the Cham and their connections with the SCS. 
This article problematizes the all-encompassing categories of Chinese or Vietnamese 
fishers and questions those SCS narratives that separate histories of China, Vietnam, and Cham. 
Offering alternative and more inclusive narratives of Tanmen and Lý Sơn, I have shown that the 
ethnic and professional categories have always been embodied, relational, and temporal, as the 
vast sea spaces divided and connected different coastal communities across the SCS. Navigating 
the SCS was not just a matter of contacting new people but more often an issue of renewing old 
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ties and networks (Tagliacozzo 2009, 114). In those watery realms, Việt, Cham, and Chinese 
histories intermingled, making ethnic and occupational labels fluid, depending on geographical 
and historical contexts. Today, to deal with the boundlessness of the sea, the professional label of 
“fisherman” is combined with the national categories of “Vietnamese” or “Chinese” to enforce 
present-day maritime enclosures and project them into the past despite the common historical, 
cultural, and ethnic flows that always existed in the SCS. Paraphrasing South Asia historian 
Sunil Amrith, who rightly observes that “oceanic history is itself a kind of cartography” (2013, 
285), I argue that by foregrounding the SCS’s fishers—linked by seafaring skills, trade, and 
voyages—we can see beyond the imposed cartographic order and territorial anxieties of the 
modern nation-state to a more inclusive world, in which Cham history does not end where Lý 
Sơn and Hainan histories begin. In this world, fishing—next to trade and seafaring—has no 
definable national borders. 
 
Edyta Roszko is a postdoc in the department of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies at the 
University of Copenhagen. Research for this article was funded by the People Programme 
(Marie Curie Actions) of the People’s Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) 
under REA grant agreement no. PIEF-GA-2012-326795 and by the Danish Council for 
Independent Research in Culture and Humanities under agreement no. 0602-02917B/FKK. The 
author’s deepest thanks go to Franck Billé for his invitation to contribute to this special issue 
and for his valuable comments. She is also grateful to Keila Diehl and three anonymous 




1 The Nine-Dash Line refers to the demarcation line used by China to claim its sovereignty 
over sea features within the lines and its right to marine and submarine resources. See 
Marina Tsirbas, “What Does the Nine-Dash Line Actually Mean?,” The Diplomat, June 2, 
2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/what-does-the-nine-dash-line-actually-mean/, 
accessed November 29, 2016.  
2 See “PCA Press Release: The South China Sea Arbitration” (“The Republic of the 
Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China”), July 12, 2016. Available at Permanent 
Court of Arbitration website, https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/07 
/PH-CN-20160712-Press-Release-No-11-English.pdf, accessed July 12, 2016.  
3 See, for example, James Lillywhite, “South China Sea Dispute: Anti-Beijing Protesters in 
Vietnam Mark Battle of the Paracel Islands Anniversary,” International Business Times, 
January 19, 2016, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/south-china-sea-dispute-anti-beijing 
-protesters-vietnam-mark-battle-paracel-islands-anniversary-1538765, accessed May 13, 
2016. 
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4 I analyzed maritime territorialization, sovereignty, and territoriality in the context of the 
SCS disputes in Roszko (2015).  
5 These are slogans I saw on propaganda posters during my field research in Tanmen and 
Lý Sơn in 2014 and 2015. 
6 Hainan Island is located about 170 nautical miles (281 km) from the Paracels. The total 
population of Tanmen is about 30,000 people, 9,000 of whom are engaged in fishing. The 
Cham population in Sanya is estimated at around 5,000 people (Thurgood, Thurgood, and 
Li 2006, 12). 
7 For the Buginese connection with the South China Sea, see Warren (1981). 
8 See, for example, “Our Geng Lu Bu Is on CCTV1,” July 14, 2016, Foreign Affairs Office 
of Hainan Province website, http://enfaohn.hainan.gov.cn/swsqwywb/wsqwbgsWNWQ 
/201607 /t20160714_2063329.htm, accessed July 20, 2016.  
9 Fishers in China get updates about new fishing laws and regulations through the Fishery 
Law Enforcement Command, and in Vietnam through the Fisheries and Aquaculture 
Department. 
10 The so-called Haiyang Shiyou 981 incident refers to the crises in Sino-Vietnamese 
relations caused by China’s installation of an oil rig in the area claimed by Vietnam as its 
EEZ. 
11 Lý Sơn Island was also an important part of a network of wells providing freshwater to 
Cham sailors but also to Arab and other foreign ships (Hardy 2009, 111). 
12 The integration of Cham into Chinese society and their various strategies to navigate 
between different ethnic lines deserve a separate analysis beyond the scope of this article. 
For Vietnam, see Nakamura (2000) and Taylor (2007).  
13 I am grateful to Francois-Xavier Bonnet (personal communication, March 21, 2016) for 
this information.  
14 I am grateful to Engseng Ho (personal communication, June 20, 2016) for pointing out 
the connection of the Cham boats with traditional dhows in the Indian Ocean. 
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